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Une hybridation de l’économie et des
neurosciences a-t-elle un sens ?
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde*
Carl Schoonover**
La neuroéconomie est une extension récente de l’économie comportementale qui cher-
che à mettre en évidence les activités et les mécanismes cérébraux qui sous-tendent les
comportements normaux ou déviants par rapport à la théorie économique de la ratio-
nalité. Gul et Pesendorfer [2005] ont formulé une critique sérieuse contre la validité
épistémologique de la neuroéconomie. Une de leurs critiques fondamentales est basée
sur l’incommensurabilité des concepts utilisés en économie et en neurosciences. Nous
répondrons à cette critique par l’exemple, en envisageant différentes directions d’ajus-
tement possibles entre les deux disciplines. Cette hybridation disciplinaire peut mettre
en relief l’unité des sciences comportementales.
neuroéconomie - unité des sciences comportementales - valeur - rationalité - émotions
Cross-talk in economics and neuroscience
Neuroeconomics is a recent extension of behavioural economics which aims at uncov-
ering the brain mechanisms and activities that mediate regular and anomalous eco-
nomic behaviour. Gul and Pesendorfer [2005] have launched a critique against the
neuroeconomic research programme, based on what they argue is the incommensura-
bility of the theoretical constructs employed by each respective discipline. To respond
to their argument we envision and illustrate several ″directions of instruction″ between
neuroscience and economics, and provide counterexamples to their critique. This dis-
ciplinary cross-talk suggests that neuroeconomics may play a crucial conceptual and
methodological role in fostering the unity of behavioural sciences.
neuroeconomics - unity of behavioural sciences - value - rationality - emotions
Classification JEL : D87
1. The ″mindless economics”
objection: incommensurable
disciplines and constructs
Neuroeconomics, a hybrid composed of experimental methods in neuro-
sciences and economics, can be understood as an extension of behavioural
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economics. It is predicated upon the hypothesis that in order to faithfully
account for human economic behaviour, one needs to understand the neural
underpinnings of this behaviour. In other words, since biology generates
behaviour, the subject of behavioural economics, an understanding of the
underlying biological mechanisms will afford a more accurate, and finer-
grained, explanation of this behaviour. Topics of interest in neuroeconomics
include choice under uncertainty, social games and fairness, the tension
between consumption and saving, preference construction, and decision-
making. Several surveys summarize the various lines of research and recent
results in this emerging field (Camerer and al. [2005], Rustichini [2005],
Braeutigam [2005]). Three major converging trends has given rise to the
neuroeconomics research programme: the availability of new brain-imaging
tools, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which mea-
sure neural activity underpinning cognitive events; the recognition that neu-
ral systems encode economically relevant factors such as uncertainty and
value, as well as the identification of brain systems underlying economically
relevant behavioural patterns such as impulsivity, utility discounting or al-
truism; and finally, the rise of behavioural economics as a discipline that
relaxes the strict rationality assumptions of classical economics in order to
generate more psychologically realistic models of economic behaviour.
In spite of the optimism of many of its heralds, this programme has been
subjected to a series of critiques launched against its rationale and episte-
mological coherence. Some find grounds for optimism in the potential for
overlap between economics and neuroscience, specifically because they be-
lieve that it is possible to construct methodological and formal bridges be-
tween the two fields. A pointed critique takes this very point to task: “Eco-
nomics and psychology address different questions, utilize different
abstractions, and address different types of empirical evidence. Neuro-
science evidence cannot refute economic models because the latter make no
assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of the brain.
Conversely, brain science cannot revolutionize economics because the latter
has no vehicle for addressing the concerns of economics” (Gul et Pesendor-
fer [2005]). Gul and Pesendorfer do not assess the contributions of neuro-
economic research; rather, without denying that neuroeconomics might af-
ford interesting findings, they question their relevance to descriptions and
models of the behaviour of the economic man, and reject the possibility that
mind/brain data can unseat classical assumptions that underlie economics.
In this article we reconsider the issue of the relevance of this kind of data to
economics. Specifically, we outline several promising “directions of instruc-
tion”, or ways in which the findings and models in one field can contribute
to development in the other. In sum, we seek to put pressure on Gul and
Pesendorfer’s negative claim that there is no vehicle through which one field
can address the concerns of the other, by presenting a general view of
possible interactions between them.
In this paper, we seek to address the following four key epistemological
issues:
i) What are the “directions of instruction” between neuroscience and eco-
nomics? Should we use economic models to model what happens in the
brain, or rather neural data to analyze, critique or refine economic models
36 —————————————————————————— Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Carl Schoonover
REP 118 (1) janvier-février 2008
and theories? Clearly, the latter is the focus of Gul and Pesendorfer’s – and
our – discussion, but the term “neuroeconomics” is used at times to denote
the former direction, which renders discussions of the field somewhat am-
biguous. A more general way of formulating the question is to ask whether
neuroeconomics is a branch of neuroscience or of economics. To some
authors like Sanfey [2006] the two-tiered contribution is acknowledged with
no further epistemological fuss.
ii) What is the role of new data about brain processes in refuting or con-
firming economic theories? One of neuroeconomics’ highest objectives is to
find neural correlates of economic concepts that, when taken together with
mathematical constructs and behavioural data would either corroborate or
invalidate them.
iii) Can brain data enable neuroeconomists to discriminate between theo-
ries that make differing predictions?
iv) Can neural facts provide alternative foundations to economic models ?
Some ambitious neuroeconomists do not only point to brain data as con-
firming their favourite models but as a broader justification of their particu-
lar views on economic behaviour.
In addressing these issues we seek to respond to Gul and Pesendorfer’s
critique by providing examples of fecund cross-disciplinary overlaps that
result from the use of common theoretical constructs. Taken together, they
plead in favour of the unity of behavioural sciences.
2. Economics and neuroscience may
share theoretical constructs
2.1. Analysis of brain-functioning in decision
terms
One way of highlighting the gap between the respective explanatory lev-
els of neuroscience and economics is to emphasize the contrast between, on
the one hand, algebraic utility models that may approximate human deci-
sion behaviour at a macro-level and, on the other hand, biologically-inspired
models that focus on overt decision behaviour. There are nonetheless sev-
eral ways one may bridge this gap. One is to relinquish some of the funda-
mental rationality assumptions that economic theories make. For instance,
one may abandon the notion that behaviour is a “top-down” process that
conforms to ideal axioms of rationality, and replace it with a complex
“bottom-up” system of coordination and self-organization from which rec-
ognizable patterns of behaviour emerge. The idea here would be to bridge
the gap between neural patterns on the one hand, and behaviour and eco-
nomic theoretical constructs on the other. Neuroeconomics then would be-
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come a science of levels of behavioural self-organization, applicable to ei-
ther brains or markets, and would borrow its formalizations from complex
systems theory rather than classical economics models. Clearly this would
constitute a shift away from the classical concerns of economists and psy-
chologists in interpreting human behaviour. In particular, beyond relaxing
certain axiomatic rationality assumptions in order to approximate actual
behaviour, it would result in altogether forsaking top-down assumptions and
replacing them with physical laws of organisation and coordination. This
approach was originally inspired by Hayek [1952] and can be found in V.
Smith’s own appraisal of the relevance of neuroeconomics (Smith [2003]).
In a similar vein, an approach favoured by Sanfey et al. (Sanfey [2006])
seeks to combine joint insights from economics and neuroscience in order
to gain a model of the functional organization of the brain and to acquire
data on neural correlates of economic behaviour. This notion of mutual
benefit for the two disciplines diverges from a traditional epistemological
quest for an independent foundation of a new discipline, and instead defines
neuroeconomics as a by-product of possibly converging endeavours. The
gist of the proposal is that the brain is a hierarchical structure encompassing
different subsystems cooperating or competing for the control of overt be-
haviour. This forms the picture of a brain as a firm (Brocas et Carillo [2006]).
One of the main functional contrasts here is between automatic processes
and controlled and reflective ones. Sanfey’s hierarchical model envisions
this contrast in terms of cooperation and competition between executive
control systems and emotional structures. Dual systems vary along several
dimensions – such as deliberative and emotive, or slow and fast, or cogni-
tively flexible and cognitively rigid – and capture a diverse array of con-
trasted observations on decision behaviour (Kahneman [2003]). High-level
executive and deliberative processes engage anterior and dorsal lateral re-
gions of the prefrontal cortex while low-level and automatic psychological
processes rely on the limbic system. The fact that different neural structures
mediate different behaviours relevant to decision-making, invites us to re-
vise, in turn, our understanding of how we make decisions, such as unitary
models in terms of expected utility (choice between different outcomes) or
discounted utility (choice extended over time).
We should disambiguate here between the application of economic mod-
els in order to understand the brain’s decision-making processes, and the
more general notion that economic theory may offer a method for under-
standing brain function. Camerer [2005] notes: “neuroscience is shot
through with familiar economic language – delegation, division of labor,
constraint, coordination, executive function – but these concepts are not
formalized in neuroscience as they are in economics. There is no overall
theory of how the brain allocates resources that are essentially fixed (e.g.
blood flow and attention). An ‘economic model of the brain’ could help
here”.
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2.2. The search for neural correlates of value
Some recent single-cell physiology experiments are particularly promising
examples of how economic concepts can mesh with the methodology of
biology. Paton and his colleagues [2006] trained monkeys using a “reinforce-
ment learning” paradigm so that the animals would learn to associate ab-
stract images with a reward (juice) or penalty (an irritating air puff directed
towards their eyes). Thus, when the image was presented before the penalty
or the reward, the monkeys were able to anticipate the outcome and behave
accordingly. After training, the monkeys know to begin licking a juice bottle
when presented with a “good” image, and blink when presented with a
“bad” one, in order to avoid the noxious stimulus.
As the monkeys engaged in this behavioural task, the authors recorded
single neurons in the amygdala, an area of the brain that is associated with
reinforcement learning. They found that these neurons were reliably predic-
tive of the rewards and penalties in the task, that is, the temporal dynamics
of their electrical activity correlated with the type of payoff that the monkey
could expect. Some neurons displayed a burst of electrical activity immedi-
ately after the display of a “bad” image; others displayed a similar burst
immediately after the display of a “good” one. The authors then performed
a control experiment in order to lend support to the hypothesis that these
neurons effectively carry representations of value. They inverted the re-
wards and penalties associated with each image and, as expected, found
that the monkeys adapted their behaviour to the novel circumstances, and
came to associate the old “bad” image with the positive reward, and vice-
versa. Crucially, the authors observed that the electrical activity in these
neurons was modulated, reflecting the novel scenario. For instance, neurons
that had displayed a high level of activity after a “good” image was pre-
sented, no longer displayed this activity after the switch. Furthermore, the
modulation of this neuronal activity fit the temporal dynamics of monkey’s
behavioural adaptation.
These experiments demonstrate that there are representations of positive
and negative value encoded at the level of single cells in the monkey
amygdala. Other recent experiments (e.g. Platt et Glimcher [1999], Roesch et
Olson [2004], Doris et Glimcher [2004]) have shown different types of value
representation in different areas of the primate brain. Platt et Glimcher’s
study went so far as to vary the relevant variables relevant to the computa-
tion of an expected value (probability of gain and size of gain) and found
strict correlations in the neural dynamics. In sum, these studies borrow, to
varying degrees of complexity, notions inherent to behavioural economics in
order to determine the optimal behaviour of the animals, and then establish
neural correlates for the variables that are necessary to making decisions on
a trial-by-trial basis. It should be noted that while these types of studies
depend in part on behavioural economics, and employ its formalizations to
some degree, they do not aim to challenge, refine, or develop economic
theories. Rather, they harness notions from economics in order to develop
neurobiology itself, introducing into the biological sciences concepts that
are typically the domain of economics, like value and utility. The studies
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then present a clear counter-example to Gul and Pesendorfer’s contention
that the two disciplines can’t mix because they employ different abstrac-
tions.
3. Brain data may help refine, confirm
or refute economic theories and
concepts
Modern economics is based of psychological concepts that date back to
the end of 19th century or the beginning of 20th century. Knight’s distinction
between risk and uncertainty is one case in point. Even more fundamentally
the substitution of ordinal utility for cardinal utility is a founding act of the
modern axiomatization of rational economic behaviour, and, perhaps, a step
away from psychological realism. Neuroeconomics can bear on these initial
conceptual orientations by elucidating fine-grained neural facts that would
deepen and sophisticate our conceptualization of risk and uncertainty and by
documenting how humans assess the value of a good without comparing it
to others.
Ellsberg [1961] devised a famous distinction between subjects who dis-
play contrasting attitudes when facing risky situations (where they do in fact
employ the principles of probability theory) versus uncertain situations
(where they do not, and simply manifest a kind of “uncertainty aversion”).
Since its inception Ellsberg’s paradox has attracted a fair amount of atten-
tion from decision-theorists (Gilboa et Schmeidler [1989]) and, more re-
cently, from practitioners of neuro-imaging (Rustichini [2005]). Huettel and
his colleagues (Huettel [2006]) recently detected individual differences in
brain activation depending on a subject’s preferences, and aversion to risk
and ambiguity. People who prefer ambiguity demonstrate increased activity
in the prefrontal cortex while those who prefer risk have increased activity in
the parietal cortex. This, taken together with the fact that, in our societies,
subjects manifest varying degrees of ″uncertainty aversion″, provides
grounds for re-examining the standard model of rationality. The neural
mechanisms that explain the varied attitudes toward uncertainty are a par-
ticularly fruitful avenue of neuroeconomics research.
Dayan and Yu point out an intuitive contrast between “expected uncer-
tainty”, which refers to the fact that our knowledge of the environment is
based on noisy signals (we actually expect not to know all outcomes in
every situation), and “unexpected uncertainty” which points to the unstable-
ness of the environment due to the fact that the identity of relevant signals
may change when the context changes (Dayan et Yu [2003]). In the ecologi-
cal situations in which we face environment variability, we switch between
one sort of uncertainty and the other. We are sometimes unsure of which
type of context we are currently in. These different forms of uncertainty are
represented and manipulated in different ways and one might expect that
they engage different neural systems. Dayan and Yu developed a model of
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how two distinct neuromodulatory systems – acetylcholine and noradrena-
line – encode uncertainty and how their interaction might predict whether
we should abide by a prior belief in the reliability of a cue or abandon it. We
tend to adopt different attitudes depending on the form of uncertainty we
have encoded in relation to a given environment. In particular, we either
stick to our beliefs or search for novel strategies and opportunities. This
dichotomy has been described as “exploitation versus exploration”. It cer-
tainly captures a basic distinction between the ways we make investments:
stick to familiar sources of rewards (professional, affective) or seek new
sources in a more or less reliable environment. This contrast is well-suited
to support the design of ecological protocols in neuroeconomics by mixing
field studies and measurements of brain-activity. For instance, some neuro-
economists (see Lo [2005]) have recently focused on the study of stock-
markets from the perspective of neuromodulation.
In the same way that they wish to differentiate between different kinds of
attitudes towards uncertainty by elucidating their neural underpinnings,
neuroeconomists hope investigate the neural substrates of utility – the eco-
nomic theoretical construct par excellence. Cardinal utility is a form of utility
which is measured in arbitrary units of pleasure; each individual may assign
different values of the utility of a given good. Since it is difficult to compare
the valuation of the same goods across subjects, and the valuations of
different goods made by individual subjects, economists have resorted to
using ordinal utility and ranked preferences, in which the individual subjec-
tive valuation of a good is deprived of sense. Stuphorn [2006] rightly points
out, however, that from a psychological and neuronal point of view, it would
be interesting to distinguish between assignment of value on one side, and
comparison of values on the other side. Padoa-Schioppia and Assad [2006]
have identified a population of neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex that as-
signs values to economic goods and represents its subjective utility inde-
pendently of the action needed for its acquisition. The suggestion is that the
orbitofrontal cortex might contain a map for subjective cardinal utility. In
their experiments the authors had macaque monkeys choose between two
types of juice offered in different amounts. In some trials the monkey could
choose between one drop of grape juice (which monkeys prefer) and one
drop of apple juice. In other trials, the monkey chooses between one drop of
grape juice and two drops of apple juice, and so on. The authors noted a
trade-off point between kinds of juices, at around one drop of grape juice for
three drops of apple juice. With this trade-off in mind, Padoa-Schioppia and
Assad then searched for correlations between neural activity in the orbito-
frontal cortex and the choice of one option over the other. They found that
some of these cells represented a subjective valuation of the reward, which,
crucially, were not influenced by the physical properties of the reward (type
of juice et volume), or by the action by which it was to be obtained, sug-
gesting that they may serve as a cardinal utility map. The findings touch
upon foundational concepts in economics. Indeed, should we consider eco-
nomic choice as one between goods rather than as the result of compari-
sons between consequences of actions undertaken to acquire those goods?
Second, does that choice rely on the “direct” assignment of values to avail-
able goods, or comparisons between different goods? The facts in the brain
bear directly on the principles of economics.
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4. Brain data may provide grounds for
deciding between competing
economic theories
In addition to confirming or refuting economic concepts, one may employ
brain data in order to discriminate between two theories that offer differing
predictions in a given situation. Suppose that we were to decide between
two theories, (A) and (B), the former based on a linear conception of ex-
pected utility, and the latter taking into account the loss aversion phenom-
enon. Given a simple lottery offering the choice between (1) a 0.1 probability
of obtaining $1000 and (2) a 0.5 probability to obtaining $200, theory (A)
would predict that the brain data would look identical in either case, assum-
ing that the cognitive mechanism for evaluating (1) and (2) is identical (a
plausible assumption, since both cases involve the same operation). On the
other hand, theory (B) would predict that brain data might look quite differ-
ent in either case, under the assumption that evaluating the lotteries would
implicate different activation levels of areas in the brain that mediate emo-
tions, or whichever centres are responsible for risk-aversion. Detecting dif-
ferential activation of known neural systems would provide grounds for
deciding in favour of theory (B), although of course if no differences were
detected, one could not draw any conclusion from the data. This approach
differs from the attempt to directly correlate, for instance, behaviours impli-
cating loss aversion or linear expected utility with a particular neural event.
This method rather would consist in taking advantage of neural observa-
tions – whatever their direct relevance to the economic concepts under
scrutiny – in order to discriminate between different theories encompassing
those concepts.
An instance of this kind of methodology may be found in De Martino and
colleagues’ [2006] study of the neural correlates of framing-effects. They
investigated the neural pattern associated with decisions between small,
sure amounts of money and higher, riskier ones in experimental conditions
wherein the description or framing of outcomes was manipulated. The de-
scriptive factor that was manipulated had an affective value: the sure option
was either phrased in terms of the sum to be kept or the sum to be deducted
from a fixed amount of money. The different options, while phrased differ-
ently, would result in the same outcome. The study revealed that subjects
chose the sure option more often when it was phrased positively (“keep 20
out of 50”), than when it was framed negatively (lose 30 out of 50). Brain
imaging showed that the activity of the amygdala – a region traditionally
associated with the control of emotions and the mediation of immediate
impulsive reactions – was correlated with this bias in the decision process.
The decomposition in elementary stages of this evidence yields a twofold
process of an immediate emotional response to frames used to present the
prospects and, a tendency to accept or avoid that prospect. Different activi-
ties in another brain region, the anterior cingular cortex – associated with
the interpretation and solving of cognitive conflicts – was correlated with the
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congruence between the chosen action (avoid or accept the prospect) and
the initial emotional reaction. De Martino’s results, then, would offer an
indirect confirmation of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory’s predic-
tion according to which subjects tend to avoid risk to secure a sure gain and
take risks to avoid possible losses (see Kahneman and Frederick [2006]).
Moreover, as we will see more broadly in section 6, instead of focussing on
neural correlates of theoretical constructs (e.g. “loss aversion”, “framing
effect”) this research embeds these notions in a network of patterns of
behaviour and brain activity in which is sought not only a refutation or
confirmation of a particular theory, but an explanation of it.
5. Neuroscience may drive the
development of new economic
theories and models
Social neuroscience bears on the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive
processes such as “mentalizing”, which is the ability to represent one’s and
others’ beliefs, intentions and desires and which makes socialization and
social exchange possible. Since these cognitive mechanisms are the bread
and butter of our behaviour in games, crossover between studies of neuro-
physiological function and of complex social patterns would appear to be
immediately relevant (see cautionary words in Blakemore et al. [2004]). Cer-
tain foundational questions have yet to be worked out. What does it mean
for the social scientist to know that a certain brain area is implicated in a
certain task that bears a social connotation? Moreover, even though specific
neurological abilities are involved in cognitive capacities such as anticipat-
ing others’ reactions, what foundational benefit may game-theorists obtain
from this fact? These questions are addressed by authors who promote the
crossover between social neuroscience and behavioural game theory.
Singer and Fehr [2005] justify this endeavour by noting that “economists
still know little about what enables people to put themselves in others’
shoes and how this ability interacts with their own preferences and beliefs;
(and) social neuroscience provides insight into the neural mechanism under-
lying our capacity to represent others’ intentions, beliefs and desires”. Neu-
ral mechanisms, such as that of mirror-neurons (Rizzolatti [2004]) – which
are said to enable us to encode others’ actions in the same manner that we
encode our own – might provide novel foundations for game theory. Yet it is
still unclear whether the impact of this sort of data on economics will be
foundational, conceptual or merely illustrative.
Singer and Fehr, whose explicit aim is to assess the implications of such
brain data for economics, find reasons for introducing these findings into
game theory. In a Prisoner’s Dilemma sequence, wherein the anticipation of
the other’s behaviour is crucial to determine one’s own moves, it is impor-
tant to discriminate between one’s own beliefs about the other player’s
profile (whether she is a reciprocator or not) and one’s own understanding
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of her current feelings towards oneself (whether she wishes to reciprocate
or not independently of her profile). This last ability specifically requires the
ability to empathize. Seemingly paradoxically, given that the normal solution
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma predicts defection, Singer’s research shows that
people who have higher empathy are better predictors of others’ behaviour,
hence tend to be better players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Singer [2004])
sequence. The crucial distinction here is between an abstract solution in
game-theory, and players’ actual aptitude to behave successfully in real-life
games.
In personal interactions we employ rules that have emerged in our cultural
and moral contexts. Fairness, reciprocity and mutual consent are, in part,
neuronally-encoded norms that define what is sometimes called the social
brain. Two lines of study in neuroeconomics can be pursued here: to ob-
serve the social brain at work in experimental economics settings, and to
capture subjective reactions when prevailing social and moral norms are
violated by individuals. McCabe and his colleagues (McCabe [2003]) have
discovered that players cooperate far more than predicted by traditional
game-theory in two-person anonymous single play interactions, indicating
that trust is not only the result of learning in repeated interactions but is a
primary behaviour we exemplify in one-move cooperation games. Second-
movers who cooperate in these environments do so by reading intentions in
moves, and naturally forgo defection incentives to reward trusting offers to
cooperate. Moreover, trusting first-movers anticipate such behaviour as
likely. Thus, one may posit that “mind-reading” neural mechanisms are
connected to compliance with reciprocity norms.
The second line of study of the social brain focuses on when social and
moral norms are violated. Transgressions of these norms by others and by
oneself give rise to specific and neural activities that resemble each other in
part. De Quervain and his colleagues have investigated the neural basis of
so-called altruistic punishment of defectors, which they count as a key ele-
ment in explaining cooperation among individuals who are not genetically
related (de Quervain [2004]). They found that when a subject feels the urge
to punish a defector and can do so effectively, both the caudate nucleus and
the thalamus, which are part of the reward system in the brain, display
relatively high activity. In other words, punishing the guilty is rewarding for
humans. Conversely Berthoz and her colleagues were able to show that an
anticipation-of-punishment system was engaged when subjects violated
moral norms (Berthoz [2006]). They uncovered significant bilateral amygdala
activation, which they interpret as being related to one’s anticipation of
possible punishment as the consequence of one’s immoral behaviour. This
hypothesis meshes well with De Quervain’s study on punishment of defec-
tors in trust games, suggesting a correspondence between cooperative and
defective behaviours on the one hand, and on the other, reward and pun-
ishment systems in the brain.
According to Fehr and his colleagues, the emerging knowledge concern-
ing the brain mechanisms that underlie altruistic behaviour and punishment
of defection give grounds for reconsidering the foundations of game-theory.
Behavioural game-theory should account for the subjects’ deviation from a
self-centred strategy. One apparent limitation of this line of research,
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though, is that economics is not only concerned with personal exchange
structures but also with impersonal markets and institutions – contexts in
which considerations like altruism and empathy are obviously less relevant.
However, even given the impersonal nature of these contexts, it might prove
fruitful to consider the issues of trust and trustworthiness.
6. Brain data may enter a functional
network in accounting for human
behaviour
Behavioural deviations from the unitary utility-maximizing model of
decision-making suggest that different systems compete for overt behaviour,
only a subset of which can be interpreted in terms of an explicit and effortful
attempt at maximizing utility. Another part may be understood as the inter-
action between automatic emotional processes and executive control. Some
authors try to explain the use of heuristics in reasoning and decision-making
in terms of the optimal use of brain resources, and associate them with
emotional processes (Muramatsu et Hanoch [2005]). But even if heuristics –
fast and frugal procedures – may rely, to some extent, on brain-processes
associated with emotions, they don’t necessarily present any sort of psycho-
logical unity, let alone of functional convergence at a neuronal level. Indeed,
various emotions themselves are associated with different encapsulated
brain structures whose interaction with executive function in the brain is a
good predictor of certain behavioural patterns which seem particularly rel-
evant to economists. (e.g. impulsivity, cognitive biases, etc.) The view that
several specialized neural sub-systems either cooperate or compete for the
control of overt behaviour certainly contributes to undermine classical uni-
fied views of decision-making. What emerges is a multiple-systems view of
neural structures in the brain, each of which can be studied in its own right
as encoding relevant parameters in economically relevant behavioural pat-
terns.
How could a mix of encapsulated neural systems govern an individual’s
rationality? There appears to be a profound gap between neural observa-
tions and rationality attributions. That said, many philosophers and psy-
chologists from the 1980s on (Cohen [1981], Stich [1986]) have discussed the
question rationality-attribution from the standpoint of behavioural evidence.
In analyzing the principle of charity, they contend that if we were able to
reconstruct local principles that subjects apply in their cognitive endeavours
we should prefer to make our rationality-attributions according to those
local heuristics. These authors postulate that norms of rationality – however
local – are defined by what we can call their cognitive anchoring and ad-
equacy. If people are able to maintain representations of the rules they
follow in cognitive tasks such as reasoning and decision-making, they can-
not be described as being essentially irrational. Conversely the set of norms
by which we judge individual behaviour should be cognitive adequacy in the
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sense that those norms may in principle be the object of individuals’ explicit
representations.
Behavioural economists have borrowed a dual process theory of cognition
from experimental psychology, which holds that two kinds of cognitive op-
erations – intuitive fast rigid processes on the one side and analytic con-
trolled slow flexible processes on the other side – compete for the control of
overt behaviour (Sloman [1996], Evans [2003], Kahneman [2003]). But con-
fusion arises when the fast/slow and the emotion/cognition dualities are
conflated. The contribution of automatic and sometimes unconscious pro-
cesses and the contribution of emotions in our definition of rational agents
must be distinguished. Automatic processes and heuristics sometimes lead
to suboptimal behavioural responses but they can be overridden by con-
trolled processes which make explicit to the agent which rules should be
followed in order to improve her performance. We should not judge the
agent as lacking cognitive competence so long as she displays the ability to
inhibit erroneous intuitive or impulsive behaviours and is capable of opti-
mizing her behaviour. An understanding of the neural underpinnings of the
mechanisms of cognitive inhibition and post-error behavioural adjustments
would afford a “broad” view of rationality.
A popular hypothesis bears on the contribution of emotions to reasoning
and decision-making. Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) (Dama-
sio [1994]) proposes that emotions-based signals in the brain, which arise
from the body, are integrated in brain regions dedicated to higher cognitive
functions, in particular the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, in order to regu-
late decision-making in complex individual or social situations. Those sig-
nals are emotional somatic markers which influence processes of reasoning
and decision-making in a conscious or in an unconscious way. Emotions
interfere with higher cognitive processes and introduce biases in the selec-
tion of appetitive or aversive modes of behaviour. Thus, they shape our
attitudes, in particular in situations that present features such as risk, temp-
tation, and social exchange, which, again, are of primary interest to neuro-
economists.
Most of the empirical evidence in support of SMH has been channelled
through an experimental paradigm known as the Iowa Gambling Task,
which creates a situation in which there is a trade-off between immediate
and postponed rewards. Two decks of cards are associated with rewards; the
first deck leads to immediate rewards, but long-term losses; the second deck
leads to lesser immediate rewards, but long-term gains. Damasio has exten-
sively documented the fact that patients who suffer from lesions in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex will systematically pick cards in the first deck
even when they have already experienced repeated losses. Although several
rival hypotheses could explain this pattern of behaviour, Damasio concludes
that what was specifically affected by the non-tunnelling of emotive somatic
markers through the damaged brain area was a sort of “memory of the
future” – namely the capacity, when facing a new but similar situation, to
remember our anticipation of the right thing to do after a series of errors.
Several criticisms have been aired against the SMH. Maia and McClelland
[2004] discriminate between the conscious knowledge that subjects may
obtain in each situation they face (one deck is more favourable than the
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other) and their ability to reverse their behaviour. They argue that SMH does
not adequately answer the question of why patients with a ventromedial
lesion can eventually report the difference between the decks but still per-
severe in their suboptimal behaviour. SMH would argue that that cognitive
processes unaccompanied by somatic markers fail to yield optimal behav-
ioural regulation, conscious knowledge of a situation being behaviourally
inert. An interesting research topic for neuroeconomics, then, would be to
understand how emotional and cognitive reactions to the infringement of
optimal behaviour lead to behavioural adaptation in economically relevant
situations: is cognitive adequacy alone sufficient for post-error behavioural
adjustment or is emotional marking a necessary condition? Neural evidence
can play a discriminatory role in addressing this issue on the sources of
rationality.
7. Conclusion : the unity
of behavioural sciences
Gul and Pesendorfer’s critique is founded on what they characterize as the
fundamental separation between economics and neuroscience, in terms of
the scope and the incommensurability of the theoretical constructs em-
ployed by each field. “Neuroeconomics imports the questions and abstrac-
tions of psychology and re-interprets economic models as if their purpose
were to address those questions. The standard economic model of choice is
treated as a model of the brain and found to be inadequate. Either econom-
ics is treated as amateur brain science and rejected as such or brain evi-
dence is treated as economic evidence to reject economic models”. On the
contrary, we have sought to illustrate different ways in which neural data
and economic concepts or theories could relate quite naturally to one an-
other.
To fully respond to Gul and Pesendorfer’s scepticism, however, it is not be
sufficient to merely exhibit such “directions of instruction” between neuro-
science and economics. One would need, more fundamentally, an a priori
principle to think that possibly overlapping constructs and models between
the two fields may be epistemologically coherent. In other words one would
need what Gintis [2007] labelled an integrative framework for the behav-
ioural sciences. The notion that an organism adapts to an environment in
order to increase its pleasure, plays a foundational role in this framework:
“the fitness of an organism depends on how effectively it makes choices in
an uncertain and varying environment.” For simpler organisms the environ-
ment is primitive and information is distributed in a decentralized way onto
sensory terminals. In the case of more sophisticated organisms, the brain is
understood as having evolved in a complex manner so as to become a
decision centre: “The distinguishing characteristic of the human brain lies in
its power as a decision-making mechanism”. In this framework, neuroeco-
nomics, the study of brain mechanisms that mediate choice in a variety of
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complex environments, may play a pivotal role in the integration of diverse
behavioural approaches.
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